The paper first takes a brief look at the economic and judicial justification for the independent status of central banks in general and will thereby also illustrate the different manifestations of independence that need to be distinguished. Recent developments will then form the initial point for a detailed analysis of the concrete range of the ECB's independence. This analysis will end with a positive conclusion. Until today its independent status has not been violated by any of the analysed measures. Possible threats, however, continue to exist. Safeguarding the independent status of the ECB thus remains an important mission not only for legal scholars.
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A. Independence in times of crisis
"It shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the management of its finances." Though this rule 1 concerning the ECB did not enjoy the privilege of being quoted on one of Germany's most prominent tabloid papers ("Bild") as it was the case with the no-bail-out clause of Art. 125 TFEU, the ECB's independent status is something any regular newspaper reader is most surely aware of -at least since the Eurocrisis. of the ECB or are there at least certain restrictions as regards its intensity that might be derived directly from the ECB's independent status? These -among others -are the questions the paper seeks to find answers to.
To do so I will first take a brief look at the economic and judicial justification for the independent status of central banks in general (B) and will thereby also illustrate the different manifestations of independence that need to be distinguished (C) -though the ECB, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve all enjoy some sort of independent status within their mandate, its degree still differs significantly.
Recent developments will then form the initial point for a detailed analysis of the concrete range of the ECB's independence (D). While (normal) and usually verbal criticism by the media, scholars or politicians will generally be just as unproblematic as certain duties to report or to cooperate, the Member States' fiscal and wage policy, possible bond purchases by the ECB as well as a too extensive judicial control might indeed -at least under certain circumstances -present a challenge for the independent status of the ECB. Yet, the paper will nonetheless be able to end with a positive conclusion: Until today the independent status has not been violated by any of the analysed measures. Possible threats, however, continue to exist. Safeguarding the independent status of the ECB thus remains an important mission not only for legal scholars.
B. The justicification of central bank independence I. Economic background
Though this might come as a surprise to the general public, the independent status of a central bank is no matter of course. Due to the fact that central banks perform responsibilities of public administration, integrating these agencies into the general hierarchical organisation of administration -with the government at the top -would appear a lot more convincing (especially in Germany). No one would ever think of an independent ministry of finance for instance. And also from a historical perspective independence from governmental interference is by no means the somewhat natural status of a central bank. 5 Not least the Bank of England (as the oldest central bank) was in actual fact founded in 1694 especially to help Great Britain's government out of its financial misery that had occurred due to several (and not always successful) war affairs, as Albert E. Feavearyear points out:
"Finally, and almost as a last resource, they founded the Bank of England." 6 Quite similarly Alexander Hamilton hoped for significant assistance, "in obtaining pecuniary aids, especially in sudden emergencies" 7 when founding the first Bank of the United States in 1791.
Only the gradual switch of central banks from such "Banks of the State" to "Banks objective -with diverging focal points -lies in safeguarding price stability 9 which is also the "core purpose" 10 of the ECB 11 according to Art. 127 (1) TFEU. 12 The responsibility for this new core purpose forms the actual starting point of the whole independence discussion. The opening question is: Can a central bank perform this new task effectively as long as it is integrated into and thus dependent from (or even controlled by) the government? Two possible problems might hinder such an effective performance: First of all several inflation favouring conflicts of interests might arise as regards the governmental fiscal, wage, and employment policy. 13 And second of all politicians might be apt to consider a price-enhancing expansion of money supply in order to profit from the possible short term economy-boosting 39 however, appears way too simplistic (and was probably intended to appear so). Putting these necessary at least partly discretionary decisions in the hands of independent central bankers (and not the government) thus is nothing
Taylor's rules concept would stand against.
Taylor, however, indeed has a point where he argues that it is less the formal but rather the internal independence of central bankers that is decisive. 40 And indeed:
A lot of central bankers might not be equipped with the necessary amount of such internal independence as a study by Roland Vaubel suggests even for the so exemplary German Bundesbank. 41 But is the potential danger of such a "political capture" an argument against the formal independence of central banks as such?
Obviously not, as only formal independence offers at least the chance of independent and goal-focused decisions in the first place. Formal independence is thus a necessary yet not sufficient condition 42 where one wants to uphold this chance (how big or small it may be).
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The criticism formulated by Bernd Hayo and Carsten Hefeker therefore focuses on a different aspect of the independence dogma. They first of all point out that the repeated negative correlation between independence and inflation rate was merely a statistical correlation and therefore not to be confused with causality. 44 Several empirical studies in fact pointed to the conclusion that reaching the price stability goal depended less on the institutional status of the central bank but mainly on the inflation culture of a society. 45 Thus, in countries where preventing inflation was regarded as a necessary requirement for the prosperity of a society even a dependent central bank would be able to safeguard price stability. 46 However, no independent central bank would stand a chance against a "culture of inflation" -especially as the independent status was mostly guaranteed only by statute (and not by the constitution)
. 47 Yet again, these findings alone still not deliver a decisive argument against independence as such: In the worst case this status would be merely ineffective and thus useless but still not harmful. Hayo and Hefeker, however, doubt such a "useless but not harmful" conclusion due to the fact that there is no proven negative correlation between independence and inflation. According to their findings there might be rational reasons for a society to stick to such a model where it was compatible with the general political and legal system as well as the organisation of the labour market. What they wanted to make clear, however, was the fact that an independent status was neither generally the best status nor for itself sufficient for safeguarding price stability. It appears fair to say, therefore, that a lot of questions (still) remain open.
As a legal scholar one will obviously not be able to solve this economic dispute.
However, it makes clear that a society deciding in favour of an independent central bank is at least not completely off track as regards its economic rationality. 50 Yet, from a legal perspective such a decision obviously needs to be compatible with all relevant normative, especially constitutional requirements. And here the democratic principle comes into play -an aspect not least the German literature has dealt with in abundance (first regarding the Bundesbank and now the ECB).
II. (German) Democratic Theory
Compliance with the democratic principle first of all does not follow automatically from the abovementioned (possible) economic rationality behind the independent status of a central bank. 51 To modify a quote by the German legal scholar Christoph institution cannot be justified with this argument, making it necessary to either find a different one -which will be very difficult according to the German interpretation of the democratic principle -or to refrain from transferring the task in the first
place. An independent central bank officially equipped with economic competences therefore always triggers alarm signals for German scholars. The fact that Art. 127
(1) TFEU states that "the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union" appears acceptable only as long as this part of the mandate is interpreted in a narrow sense respecting its clear subordination under the ECB's primary task of safeguarding price stability. This special "German sensibility" forms the main background of the whole dispute that arose between the German Constitutional Court and the ECB during the Eurocrisis (especially as regards the OMT-Program) and might also be the reason why the ECB never reverted to its "economic" part of its mandate, even though this probably would have been possible from a normative perspective. 61 Unsurprisingly the German Constitutional Court also reverted to this argument in its second preliminary ruling initiated in July 2017. 62 It also seems noteworthy that the independent status of the central bank -from a German perspective -cannot be justified with the special expertise or competence of the relevant central bankers, automatically leading to "better" monetary decisions. Such a justification "by expertise" would not be acceptable to the German Basic Law as it would undermine (at least in the long run) the general requirement of dual legitimation. 63 Why not revert to such a "rule of authorized experts" 64 in all important political areas if experts are obviously more competent to find "right" or at least "better" answers than "normal" politicians? Such a concept -once again and just recently proposed by Jason Brennan 65 -would finally lead to a self-abolishment of democracy and indeed: Brennan himself prefers a "moderate epistocracy". However, such a concept not only neglects the basic idea of free equality of each individual but also (and more importantly) completely misses the fact that it is impossible to conclude which decision would actually have been "right" or "better". Even experts (or epistocrats) can be mistaken and with more than one expert asked we will usually find more than one opinion how to proceed.
Or to put it with Winston Churchill: "If you put two economists in a room, you get two opinions, unless one of them is Lord Keynes, in which case you get three opinions." So which one of these expert opinions is "right" or "better"? The problem can be witnessed in the current ECB-Debate: German experts are criticizing ECB-experts and each side obviously believes it is right and has the better arguments. But why should a society have to live with the opinion of the more or less randomly chosen expert leading the independent agency and not be free to choose which expert to follow? In other words: "auctoritas, non veritas facit legem." 66 These relations between independence and democracy should not be forgotten as the voices demanding more and more independent agencies are getting louder and louder -not only but especially at the European level. (neither from the Union nor from the Member States). The term "price stability" in Art. 127 (1) TFEU is a so-called "undefined legal term" that has to be "filled with life" primarily by the ECB itself -a conclusion that (as we will see later) necessarily has consequences as regards the intensity of judicial control in this core area of monetary policy. Currently the ECB has set its inflation target at "under, but close to 2%". 72 Compatible with its mandate, however, would not only be a slightly lower but also a slightly higher inflation target of up to 3% or even 4% percent. 73 The
Bank of England -not only the oldest but clearly one of the most important central banks worldwide -enjoys no such goal-independence, as the concrete inflation target is decided upon by the government on a yearly basis; 74 its degree of independence thus differs significantly when compared to the one of the ECB.
Goal-choice-independence as the second form of independence allows a central bank to choose autonomously from a certain catalogue of assigned goals and to decide which of these goals to pursue with priority depending on the economic environment; it thus reaches further than mere goal-independence. We find this and finally duties to cooperate that might arise from the instance that the ECB became a formal institution with the Treaty of Lisbon (3).
Public criticism
The fact that monetary policy will hardly ever remain undisputed in public was recently and once again proven during the financial-and the following eurocrisis. 79 See A. Thiele, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro, p. 32 f.
In most cases such criticism will thereby focus on the concrete measures taken by the ECB, thus touching its instrumental independence. The ECB's definition of price stability -as part of its goal-independence -has indeed hardly ever been part of such a public debate and in actual fact seems broadly accepted 80 and it would be indeed utopian to link the independent status with the end of any form of political pressure. 92 In fact the independent status is the necessary (though not sufficient) requirement, for the central bankers to face up to such political pressure. One should thereby also consider that it might be a lot more threatening for the democratic process if politicians should generally refrain from any critical statement due to a false understanding of independence than if they should now and then go a little too far with their critique -especially as neither the public nor the media would appreciate such "over-the-line-criticism". So this also speaks for a reserved approach towards the normative limitations for political critique. As a general rule, therefore, critical statements formulated by politicians might challenge the internal independence of the central bankers but will not violate the instrumental independence of the ECB itself.
Duties to report to European institutions
87 True also for other independent positions, see for instance the actions taken by Christine Lagarde, the Executive Director of the IMF and former French finance minister. 92 Not convincing therefore the statement of the ECJ, No. C-11/00, mn. 134 (Commission/ECB) according to which the independent status "seeks, in essence, to shield the ECB from all political pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue the objectives attributed to its tasks, through the independent exercise of the specific powers conferred on it for that purpose by the EC Treaty and the ESCB Statute." Not only compatible with its independent status but necessary in any democratic system are certain duties to report to other institutions (and the public) that are thus foreseen in practically all central bank systems. For the ECB we find such rules in Art. 15 of its statute and Art. 284 (3) TFEU. 93 Additionally, the ECB is monitored by the Court of Auditors and is integrated into the European Anti Fraud System (OLAF). 94 Only such duties to report secure the minimum standard of accountability necessary for any authority in a democracy. 95 By reporting and explaining the central bank thus takes the necessary responsibility for its actions and thereby also ensures that no other institution (for instance the government) is held responsible in public. Above that reporting and openly discussing its policies has at least partly the same effect as public criticism: The ECB is forced to reflect its actions and thereby might find better solutions how to react in future. In the long run a central bank will indeed only succeed if it is able to explain in a comprehensible manner why it acted in a certain way (and not in another), making arbitrary action more or less impossible. 96 Independent activity is no secret occupation, the ECB is no "Black-Box". Its actions need to be critically accompanied not only by the public but also by the European Parliament 97 and even the national parliaments 98 . And within this process critical statements are not only possible but welcomed as long as they are brought forward in an adequate manner.
Central bankers do not have to be handled as if they were "raw eggs".
Duties to cooperate
With the treaty of Lisbon the ECB was assigned formal institutional status by being included in the list of institutions in Art. 13 TEU. 99 Formally this changed nothing as regards its independent status. Yet, the ECB articulated concerns that the "mutual 93 See also U. Reumann 
II. Threats to independent monetary policy
As possible threats to monetary policy I would like to discuss certain scenarios in which the central bank might still be acting independently from a formal perspective, while its actual scope of action, however, appears dramatically diminished due to specific external influences. In such cases the central bank then might be forced to take actions it might not have taken otherwise, a scenario discussed here regarding the fiscal and wage-policy of the Member States on the one hand (1) and the ECB's intended and partly already carried out bond purchase programs on the other (2). And finally a certain external monetary philosophy might be imposed on the "independent" central bank where a too extensive judicial control 100 See U. Häde makes certain monetary actions impossible the central bank deems necessary to safeguard price stability (3).
Fiscal and wage policy of the Member States
The fact that the fiscal and the wage policy of the Member States have a significant influence on monetary policy is first of all neither surprising nor specifically problematic. All these policies might pursue different objectives yet do not stand completely separately next to each other. where this seems unavoidable from a monetary policy perspective -then, however, the central bank has no other choice than to interfere and take such "hurtful" actions.
Independence is threatened, however, if fiscal and wage policy should provoke economic consequences that make it more or less impossible for the central bank to fulfil its mandate. As regards the financial policy this is the case especially in times of excessive public debt. Due to the reduced political scope of action in such times, states have a huge interest to at least partly reduce their debt burden by monetarizing their debt with the help of an unanticipated inflationary monetary policy and additional seigniorage earnings. 106 In "normal" times one should obviously expect an independent central bank to resist such political pressure. In fact this kind of pressure was the actual reason to introduce independent central banks in the first place. It gets problematic, however, as soon as the public debt ratio reaches a level that raises doubt on the medium-and long-term sustainability of public debt. If in such an environment the real interest rate should be above the economic growth rate (r bigger g) -and this is no particular unrealistic scenario -this debt ratio will rise further even in the case of a balanced primary budget (so called "dept trap").
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If one excludes a national bankruptcy that obviously can only be the absolute last resort from a political perspective there are only two ways to reduce the debt ratio under such circumstances: Either the state manages to produce significant primary surpluses, an option that will not only be very stressful but hardly possible overnight or monetary policy becomes more expansive. In the end it all depends on the central bankers themselves: "As long as there is no absolute (and absolute convincing) strict rule, the people and personalities in charge will matter." As regards the independence of a central bank it is thus not judicial control generally 125 but rather the intensity of such control that might appear problematic. 126 Judicial control therefore has to step back where the court is functionally overstrained due to the economic complexity of the respective manner.
The central bank needs to be equipped with a sufficient margin of appreciation that is extracted from judicial control. 127 The detailed content of undefined legal terms (such as "price stability") is thus to be determined not by the respective court but by the ECB itself. And the same is true for the evaluation of the current and future economic surroundings of the whole monetary area and the decision on the thus necessary monetary actions. Within its judicial control the court is thereby limited to verifying the general tenability of the central bank's conclusions. It would not be compatible with the independent status if a court were to replace such tenable conclusions with its own -even if these should be regarded as equally tenable.
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In its first request for preliminary ruling, however, the German Constitutional Court did exactly that by simply resuming the opposing position of the German Bundesbank, without losing a single word regarding the tenability of the opinion of the ECB. Why though should the opinion of the Bundesbank be of any higher normative value than the one of the ECB, especially if one considers the fact that the Bundesbank is actually a dependent part of the ESCB with the ECB at the top? 129 And in its second request for preliminary ruling initiated in July 2017 the Constitutional Court explicitly pointed out that "the acceptance of the goals as defined by the relevant European institutions combined with the appreciation of a wide margin of discretion of these institutions and a limitation of judicial control is eligible to enable these institutions an independent disposition as regards the range of the competences transferred upon them. Such an understanding of the competences does not sufficiently respect the principle of conferral and the necessity to interpret the ECB's mandate in a restrictive manner". 130 The
Constitutional Court then goes on to point out why it believes that the ECB's bond purchase program therefore neither respects Art. 123 TFEU nor Art. 127 TFEU and thereby once again takes hardly any opposing statements by legal scholars 131 into account that might prove at least the tenability of the ECB's actions. The independence of the ECB therefore once again might be on for a tough test.
E. Conclusion and outlook
The independent status of a central bank remains economically disputed yet can be justified from a democratic perspective and continues to be the "normative reality"
for the ECB. This status is neither threatened by harsh critique nor by duties to report or to cooperate that, in fact, actually might have a positive effect on its performance. However, a mistaken finance and wage policy of the Member States might have problematic consequences so that it seems more than sensible to try to 
